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This article challenges the results of the ‘classical’ managerial delegation literature, where it is assumed that the weight of the managerial bonus only depends on the owner's will to maximise… Click to show full abstract
This article challenges the results of the ‘classical’ managerial delegation literature, where it is assumed that the weight of the managerial bonus only depends on the owner's will to maximise his own profits. By considering sales (S) (resp. relative profit (RP)) contracts, the received literature has found that (S,S) (resp. (RP,RP)) is the unique pure‐strategy sub‐game perfect Nash equilibrium in a game that contrasts S (resp. RP) with pure profit maximisation (PM). This article shows that none of the previous results may hold when the owner negotiates about managerial compensation with his manager. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Journal Title: Managerial and Decision Economics
Year Published: 2017
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