Photo by homajob from unsplash
We study an allocation problem of heterogeneous indivisible objects among agents without money. Each agent receives at most one object and prefers any object to nothing. We identify the class… Click to show full abstract
We study an allocation problem of heterogeneous indivisible objects among agents without money. Each agent receives at most one object and prefers any object to nothing. We identify the class of rules satisfying strategy-proofness, Pareto-efficiency, and the identical preferences lower bound. Each rule of this class is included in Pápai’s (Econometrica 68:1403–1433, 2000) rules and can be described by a top trading cycle rule associated with an inheritance structure that satisfies a symmetry condition called U-symmetry.
Keywords:
strategy proofness;
indivisible objects;
identical preferences;
preferences lower;
lower bound;
allocation problem
Journal Title: Economic Theory
Year Published: 2018
Link to full text (if available)
Share on Social Media: Sign Up to like & get
recommendations!
Journal Title: Economic Theory
Year Published: 2018
Link to full text (if available)
Share on Social Media: Sign Up to like & get
recommendations!