LAUSR

Optimal contract regulates the expected activities of both principals and agents, and influences how the gains from the cooperation are shared between the two participators. Thus, it is necessary and wise for principals to seek for the optimal contracts during the period of negotiations. To determine the optimal contracts, there are several kinds of agency models based on different measures, such as probability measure, capacity measure, credibility measure and uncertainty measure. This paper primarily presents a comparative review of random agency model, fuzzy agency model and uncertain agency model. This comparative review is aimed at not only summarizing the structure and feature of each agency model but also guiding on how to identify the most suitable agency model for each specific principal agent problem. Motivated by this idea, these three classes of agency models are respectively investigated about their structure, feature and application, and then an empirical comparison among these models is basically carried out from several aspects, such as information diversity, decision rule and calculation. As a significant contribution, the comparative result in this paper provides the guidance for the principals on how to identify the most suitable agency model for each special principal agent problem in a certain setting.