LAUSR

In this paper, we consider an optimal insurance problem from the perspective of a risk-averse individual who faces an insurable risk as well as some background risk and wants to maximise the expected utility of his/her final wealth. To reduce ex post moral hazard, we follow Huberman et al. (Bell J. Econ. 14:415–426 1983) to assume that alternative insurance contracts satisfy the principle of indemnity and the no-sabotage condition. When the insurance premium is calculated by the expected value premium principle, a necessary and sufficient condition for the optimality of an insurance contract is established under a general dependence structure between insurable and background risks. By virtue of this condition, some qualitative properties of optimal contracts are developed, a scheme is provided to improve any suboptimal insurance strategy, and optimal insurance forms are derived explicitly for some dependence structures of interest. These forms are not always piecewise linear.