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We study search games in which the hider may hide in a finite number of locations. We assume that the cost of searching these locations does not depend on the… Click to show full abstract
We study search games in which the hider may hide in a finite number of locations. We assume that the cost of searching these locations does not depend on the order in which the locations are searched. From these assumptions we derive that the cost function is submodular, thus placing search games with an immobile hider in the context of coalitional games.
Keywords:
value set;
search;
search value
Journal Title: Annals of Operations Research
Year Published: 2017
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Journal Title: Annals of Operations Research
Year Published: 2017
Link to full text (if available)
Share on Social Media: Sign Up to like & get
recommendations!