LAUSR

This article seeks to develop a back-to-back approach to the notions of ‘security governance’ and ‘security sector reform’. It draws on two small-scale grassroots policing arrangements in Burundi, arguably falling out-of-scope of state management, to question the notion of ‘wide security sector reform’ as promoted by the development aid community. The use of informal sentinels, guarding almost every commercial and domestic buildings in Bujumbura and the reconversion of bandits into guards in the countryside, make both a case for considering the grassroots policing arrangements in Burundi as blind spots of security sector reform. Accordingly, the article shows how, in a transitioning context where different agents and normativities – namely the government, the police, corporate security actors, donor states and institutions, individuals, transnational norms on (private) security and local dynamics – are intertwined in the provision of security, discrepancies between donor discourses and local dynamics remain at work. While recent conceptualizations of security sector reform formally depart from state-centered views of security governance, implementation on the ground still resists holistic approaches of security. To a certain extent, these discrepancies reflect the theoretical debate over the state’s role in security governance, particularly in contexts where concerns about democratic oversight, the rule of law and accountability arise. In this sense, the article intends to contribute to recent insights on critical security sector reform and nodal security governance.