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The Moral Objection to Modal Realism

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If David Lewis’s modal realism (MR) is true, then there are many, many people. According to Mark Heller, this is bad news. He takes MR to imply that “there are… Click to show full abstract

If David Lewis’s modal realism (MR) is true, then there are many, many people. According to Mark Heller, this is bad news. He takes MR to imply that “there are at least some cases in which it is permissible to let drowning children drown when it would be easy to save them.” But since he holds the reasonable view that this is never permissible, he thinks that MR is false. Here, I argue that Lewis needn’t be troubled by this objection: it provides no reason to reject MR for those who share Lewis’s moral outlook. Moreover, I argue that disagreement with common sense needn’t be severe if we can show both (a) that there’s a sense in which common sense is correct and (b) we have little reason to care about the sense in which common sense is mistaken.

Keywords: moral objection; modal realism; common sense; sense

Journal Title: Erkenntnis
Year Published: 2017

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