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We present an argument against a standard evidentialist position on the ethics of belief. We argue that sometimes a person merits criticism for holding a belief even when that belief… Click to show full abstract
We present an argument against a standard evidentialist position on the ethics of belief. We argue that sometimes a person merits criticism for holding a belief even when that belief is well supported by her evidence in any relevant sense. We show how our argument advances the case for anti-evidentialism (pragmatism) in the light of other arguments presented in the recent literature, and respond to a set of possible evidentialist rejoinders.
Keywords:
ethics belief;
pessimism defence;
belief;
rationalizing pessimism;
impermissible self;
self rationalizing
Journal Title: Erkenntnis
Year Published: 2019
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Journal Title: Erkenntnis
Year Published: 2019
Link to full text (if available)
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recommendations!