LAUSR

Moral agency status is often given to those individuals or entities which act intentionally within a society or environment. In the past, moral agency has primarily been focused on human beings and some higher-order animals. However, with the fast-paced advancements made in artificial intelligence (AI), we are now quickly approaching the point where we need to ask an important question: should we grant moral agency status to AI ? To answer this question, we need to determine the moral agency status of these entities in society. In this paper I argue that to grant moral agency status to an entity, deliberate norm-adherence must be possible (at a minimum). In this paper I argue that, under the current status quo, AI systems are unable to meet this criterion. The novel contribution this paper makes to the field of machine ethics is first, to provide at least two criteria with which we can determine moral agency status. We do this by determining the possibility of deliberate norm-adherence through examining the possibility of deliberate norm-violation. Second, to show that establishing moral agency in AI suffer the same pitfalls as establishing moral agency in constitutive accounts of agency.