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Different notions of objectivity support different notions of what is required for a moral value or obligation to be experienced as objective. If the objectivity of a property (moral or… Click to show full abstract
Different notions of objectivity support different notions of what is required for a moral value or obligation to be experienced as objective. If the objectivity of a property (moral or otherwise) requires that it can exist even when we fail to notice its existence, then experiencing a property (moral or otherwise) as objective will require that we imagine it appearing in some way that is not presently available to us. Explaining what that imagining involves is the central task of this paper. Defending the epistemic value of such imagining is a secondary aim.
Journal Title: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
Year Published: 2021
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