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A non-cooperative approach is employed to solve the problem of allocating the total cost of building and maintaining an airport runway among its users. More precisely, it is proposed a… Click to show full abstract
A non-cooperative approach is employed to solve the problem of allocating the total cost of building and maintaining an airport runway among its users. More precisely, it is proposed a non-cooperative bargaining game with a unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) outcome, and it is shown that the SPE outcome payoffs coincide with those prescribed by the nucleolus of the corresponding airport cooperative game.
Keywords:
yielding nucleolus;
cooperative mechanism;
non cooperative;
nucleolus airport;
airport problems;
mechanism yielding
Journal Title: Group Decision and Negotiation
Year Published: 2018
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Journal Title: Group Decision and Negotiation
Year Published: 2018
Link to full text (if available)
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recommendations!