Few studies have evaluated Nagin and Pogarsky’s (2004) proposed distinction between impulsivity and discounting. This study evaluates and expands upon their framework to consider distinct discounting rationales, perceived age-at-death (PAAD)… Click to show full abstract
Few studies have evaluated Nagin and Pogarsky’s (2004) proposed distinction between impulsivity and discounting. This study evaluates and expands upon their framework to consider distinct discounting rationales, perceived age-at-death (PAAD) and expected social value (ESV), and whether impulsivity conditions the effects of these discounting rationales on offending; both in the short-term and over time. Negative binomial and group-based trajectory modeling strategies are used in conjunction with a sample of high-risk males from the Pathways to Desistance Study to assess Nagin and Pogarsky’s framework. In the negative binomial models, impulsivity and PAAD influence offending, while ESV does not. Impulsivity level also does not condition the effects of discounting. In the trajectory models, PAAD and impulsivity influence offending, while ESV does not. Here, impulsivity level moderates the effect of ESV, but not PAAD. Findings support Nagin and Pogarsky’s general framework of inter-temporal choice but also encourage scholars to focus more closely on the diverse rationales for temporal-orientation. Further, consideration of these mechanisms within a developmental perspective is necessary. Implications for theory and future research are discussed.
               
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