LAUSR

Assessing the scientific status of theories of consciousness is often a difficult task. In this paper, I explore the dialectic between the Integrated Information Theory (Oizumi et al. PLoS Comput Biol , 10(5), e1003588, 2014 ; Tononi et al. Nat Rev Neurosci , 17(7), 450-61 , 2016 ) and a recently proposed criticism of that theory: the ‘unfolding argument’ (Doerig et al. Consciousness and Cognition , 72, 49-59 , 2019 ). I show that the phenomenology-first approach in consciousness research can lead to valid scientific theories of consciousness. I do this by highlighting the two reasons why the unfolding argument fails: first, phenomenology-first theories are grounded, not circular. Second, falsificationism does not provide an adequate demarcation criterion in philosophy of science. I conclude that this specific debate has significance for how, in general, consciousness researchers test and criticize theories of consciousness, and how dismissing the phenomenology-first methodology in favour of a third person-based methodology means endorsing a position in philosophy of mind that has already been challenged.