LAUSR

The theme of this special issue is minimalism about truth, a conception which has attracted extensive support since the landmark publication of Paul Horwich’s Truth (1990). Since its initial publication, Horwich’s book has become required reading for truth theorists and students alike. It not only cemented the deflationist thought that debates about the nature of truth can be fruitfully transformed into debates about the utility of truth predicates, but also re-oriented theories away from traditionalmetaphysical debates and concerns, such as whether a conception of truth must accommodate some form of metaphysical realism. Arguably, alethic minimalism is now the most dominant conception of truth on offer, and certainly among the most well-known. Horwich’s minimalism divides into two parts. One part is the minimal theory—socalled because of its form, although it is actually an infinite list of propositions. The other part is the minimal conception, which is a collection of philosophical theses, corollaries, and qualifications concerning the adequacy of the minimal theory. For instance, one qualification constitutive of the minimal conception is that paradoxical or paradox-generating propositions are excluded. Another is that propositions are the primary and proper bearers of truth. That instances of the equivalence schema,