LAUSR

1 Epistemic dependence is to be distinguished from ontological dependence (e.g., the dependence of one entity for its existence upon another entity; see Koslicki (2013) and Tahko and Lowe (2015) for two overviews of the literature) as well as from causal dependence, which is a key notion in David Lewis’s counterfactual account of causation—see Lewis (1973). 2 Zangwill (Forthcoming) offers an alternative notion of epistemic dependence which is not goal-oriented. According to this notion, epistemic facts (e.g., knowledge) partially or fully depend on non-epistemic facts, which is an instance of a more general form of dependency between evaluative and non-evaluative facts. In Zangwill’s words, “knowledge cannot be bare in the same sense that evaluative properties quite generally cannot hold barely. If we know something then there must be something in virtue of which we know it, just as if an action is bad then there must be something about the action in virtue of which it is bad” (Zangwill Forthcoming: p. 3).