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The idea that truth is the fundamental epistemic good is explained and defended. It is argued that this proposal has been prematurely rejected on grounds that are both independently problematic… Click to show full abstract
The idea that truth is the fundamental epistemic good is explained and defended. It is argued that this proposal has been prematurely rejected on grounds that are both independently problematic and which also turn on an implausible way of understanding the proposal. A more compelling account of what it means for truth to be the fundamental epistemic good is then developed, one that treats the intellectual virtues, and thereby virtuous inquiry, as the primary theoretical notion.
Keywords:
intellectual virtues;
truth;
virtues epistemic;
epistemic value;
value truth
Journal Title: Synthese
Year Published: 2019
Link to full text (if available)
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Journal Title: Synthese
Year Published: 2019
Link to full text (if available)
Share on Social Media: Sign Up to like & get
recommendations!