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In this paper, we first introduce the notion of cooperative equilibria for population games and prove its existence theorem by Proposition 2 in Kajii (J Econ Theory 56:194–205, 1992). We… Click to show full abstract
In this paper, we first introduce the notion of cooperative equilibria for population games and prove its existence theorem by Proposition 2 in Kajii (J Econ Theory 56:194–205, 1992). We next identify a residual dense subclass of population games whose cooperative equilibria are all essential. Moreover, we show the existence of essential components of the cooperative equilibrium set by proving the connectivity of minimal essential sets of the cooperative equilibrium set.
Keywords:
essential stability;
cooperative equilibria;
population games;
equilibria population
Journal Title: Optimization Letters
Year Published: 2019
Link to full text (if available)
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Journal Title: Optimization Letters
Year Published: 2019
Link to full text (if available)
Share on Social Media: Sign Up to like & get
recommendations!