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Stephen Maitzen argues that divine command metaethics must be mistaken because it is committed to the implausible assumption that the sentence ‘God is (morally) good’ is a tautology. In this… Click to show full abstract
Stephen Maitzen argues that divine command metaethics must be mistaken because it is committed to the implausible assumption that the sentence ‘God is (morally) good’ is a tautology. In this article, I show that a charitable interpretation of R. M. Adams’ version of divine command metaethics is not committed to accept this assumption. I conclude that Maitzen’s objection merely manages to refute a strawman version of divine command metaethics.
Keywords:
god;
command metaethics;
maitzen objection;
divine command;
objection god
Journal Title: Sophia
Year Published: 2021
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Journal Title: Sophia
Year Published: 2021
Link to full text (if available)
Share on Social Media: Sign Up to like & get
recommendations!