LAUSR

In a stimulating recent article for this journal (van Wynsberghe and Robbins in Sci Eng Ethics 25(3):719-735. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-018-0030-8 , 2019), Aimee van Wynsberghe and Scott Robbins (hereafter, vW&R) mount a serious critique of a number of reasons advanced in favor of building artificial moral agents (AMAs). In light of their critique, vW&R make two recommendations: they advocate a moratorium on the commercialization of AMAs and suggest that the argumentative burden is now shifted onto the proponents of AMAs to come up with new reasons for building them. This commentary aims to explore the implications vW&R draw from their critique. In particular, it will raise objections to the moratorium argument and propose a presumptive case for commercializing AMAs.