LAUSR

Optical emissions from semiconductors have been found to leak important information from embedded security devices. Unfortunately, the required substrate thinning and photon emission microscopy equipment is typically very expensive. Low cost equipment setups are proposed for substrate thinning/polishing and photon emission microscopy. For the first time, a security attack enabling the parallel readout of embedded SRAM while freezing the clock during any/all clock cycles is demonstrated to be viable on several embedded processors. In addition, quiescent photon emissions are shown to reveal the flash outputs. The quiescent photonics side channel attack is demonstrated on the PIC16F6xx family; in addition, quiescent emissions differential image analysis is demonstrated on an ARM Cortex-M0 device to reveal data-dependent emissions. This research has important security implications illustrating that the quiescent photonics side channel is a real threat for many embedded systems, especially lidless flipchips.