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Most epistemologists maintain that true beliefs are of final epistemic value. However, Richard Feldman is a rare philosopher who is skeptical that true beliefs are of final epistemic value. The… Click to show full abstract
Most epistemologists maintain that true beliefs are of final epistemic value. However, Richard Feldman is a rare philosopher who is skeptical that true beliefs are of final epistemic value. The aim of this paper is to evaluate Feldman’s criticisms. I’ll argue that Feldman’s arguments ultimately turn on a view about the relation between epistemic duties and epistemic value that is implausible and underdeveloped.
Keywords:
value truth;
feldman epistemic;
value;
epistemic value
Journal Title: Acta Analytica
Year Published: 2019
Link to full text (if available)
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Journal Title: Acta Analytica
Year Published: 2019
Link to full text (if available)
Share on Social Media: Sign Up to like & get
recommendations!