LAUSR

Design optimization is an effective strategy to reduce construction project costs. This study focuses on the benefit of design optimization, which should be allocated to the designer. Furthermore, the distribution ratio can be determined through negotiation. In line with this view, this paper initially analyzed the benefits of engineering design optimization and the basic mechanism of its distribution. Second, we established the negotiation model of design optimization profit distribution by considering the fairness concern behavior of subjects. Finally, we set up the following three experimental scenarios: the designer solely has fairness concern behavior, the owner exclusively has fairness concern behavior, and both negotiators have fairness concern behavior. From the engineering projects perspectives, we further analyzed the effects of the fairness concerns of both negotiators in terms of engineering design optimization and negotiation performance using negotiation simulation experiments. Our experimental scenarios results show that the appropriate behavior of fairness concerns by the two negotiators is valuable in improving their own advantages. However, excessive attention to the behaviors of fairness concerns by the two negotiators may lead to an increase in the negotiation cycle, which is not beneficial in attaining optimization. This study aims to provide references for the construction project management.