LAUSR

To perform the secure communication over the insecure channel, Key Agreement Protocol is a prominent approach to generate the session key between the communication parties. Since the last two decades, researchers came up with various ideas to design the Key Agreement Protocols based on three-party authentications. However, such proposed schemes could not resist many possible threats which may occur habitually in today’s environment. In the recent era, Chen et al. designed a key agreement protocol based on three-party key authentication to avoid numerous possible threats. Unfortunately, it has been proved that their protocol couldn’t achieve the user anonymity requirement and is also vulnerable towards Denial-of-service (DoS) attack. Therefore, in this paper, to overcome these weaknesses a probable solution has been provided. The proposed scheme is not only secured against the DoS attack and able to achieve user anonymity but also sustains against any possible threats as well. Later, a formal analysis of BAN (Burrows-Abadi-Needham) logic has been demonstrated to prove the correctness of the proposed protocol. Moreover, the informal security analysis of the proposed scheme has also explained and also proved the superiority of the scheme by comparing it with other related schemes. Lastly, the proposed scheme has been simulated using ProVerif (2.0) tool to verify the secrecy of the session key establishment and the mutual authentication between the participants.