LAUSR

Over half a century ago, psychologists hypothesized that social essentialism, an intuitive theory comprising the beliefs that social categories reflect naturally occurring distinctions and that category members share an underlying and fundamental essence, lays the foundation for prejudice. In the intervening decades, research has shown that although essentialism sometimes leads to prejudicial beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors, it does not always, sometimes even leading to decreased prejudice toward stigmatized groups. The relation between essentialism and prejudice is clearly complex, but this review proposes four questions that will help clarify how and when essentialism leads to prejudice: (1) What precisely is essentialism and how might a more nuanced understanding of its components and structure shed light on the mechanisms by which essentialist beliefs contribute to prejudice?; (2) Do essentialist beliefs orient group-based prejudice toward out-groups or toward stigmatized groups, and what are the consequences of essentialist beliefs among those with minoritized identities?; (3) Do essentialist beliefs engender group-based prejudice directly, or must essentialist beliefs interact with additional information or belief systems to lead to negative consequences?; and (4) Do essentialist beliefs lay a foundation for group-based prejudice to develop, or is essentialism strategically invoked to justify existing prejudice? By posing these questions, describing what is currently known about each, and proposing future lines of inquiry that focus on the importance of including participants from a diverse set of backgrounds and across developmental periods, this review aims to stimulate research studies best designed to fill the gaps in our knowledge. By understanding how and when essentialism contributes to prejudice, we will be better equipped to use this early-emerging, but malleable, aspect of cognition to decrease prejudice and create a more equitable society.