LAUSR

Previous research has shown that fluency effects are driven by discrepancies between current and baseline fluency. Thus, illusions of truth associated with repetition (which increases statement fluency and its perceived truth-value relative to new statements) are less likely to occur when participants judge pure lists of either all-repeated or all-new statements and comparisons are between-participants, than when participants judge mixed lists and comparisons are within-participants. Still, there are demonstrations of between-participants illusions of truth in the literature. In this manuscript, we explain the emergence of between-participants truth effects in terms of hypothetical dynamic updating of fluency standards. The findings of two experiments provide evidence for this hypothesis by showing that between-participants truth effects occur most strongly for the first elements of the statement list but are reduced over time. The findings suggest that the dynamics of fluency experiences contribute to the truth effect and should be taken into account when investigating illusions of truth.