LAUSR

Abstract With the deregulation of world power markets, the importance of power market equilibrium analysis tools becomes more prominent. Due to the increasing uncertainty in the power markets, the influences of risk attitudes on the participants’ strategic bidding behaviors and market equilibrium become more significant, which makes risk feature formulation more necessary in the market bidding decision-making process. This paper fully considers the risk-averse features of power generation companies based on the concept of the conditional value at risk and proposes a bilevel equilibrium model to practically simulate market behaviors. The mathematical model is essentially a modified equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints. The upper-level problem of the model maximizes the profits minus the risks of each generation company, while the lower-level problem represents the market clearing processes of day-ahead markets by the independent system operator. A linearization method is proposed to transform the proposed model into a mixed-integer linear model. An illustrative example and a numerical example are performed to show the effectiveness, validity and adaptability of the proposed model. The comparisons with other equilibrium models demonstrate the better performances of the proposed method to simulate the market equilibrium with several oligopolies. The sensitivity analysis is proposed to analyze the phenomenon where different risk-averse levels and market ownership structures would result in different market equilibrium.