Photo by mluotio83 from unsplash
We study a persuasion game between a decision maker and an expert. Before communication, the expert searches for an evidence about the state of nature. Higher effort leads to a… Click to show full abstract
We study a persuasion game between a decision maker and an expert. Before communication, the expert searches for an evidence about the state of nature. Higher effort leads to a higher probability of discovery. We show that, contrary to everyday experiences, monitoring of effort is always suboptimal if the expert’s bias is large, yet sometimes optimal if the expert’s bias is small.
Keywords:
persuasion;
game;
hurt endogenous;
monitoring hurt;
endogenous information;
information acquisition
Journal Title: Economics Letters
Year Published: 2018
Link to full text (if available)
Share on Social Media: Sign Up to like & get
recommendations!
Journal Title: Economics Letters
Year Published: 2018
Link to full text (if available)
Share on Social Media: Sign Up to like & get
recommendations!