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Abstract This paper considers second-price sealed-bid auctions among three or more bidders. We take into account all equilibria, and examine the maximum of the equilibrium revenues, using the result of… Click to show full abstract
Abstract This paper considers second-price sealed-bid auctions among three or more bidders. We take into account all equilibria, and examine the maximum of the equilibrium revenues, using the result of Blume and Heidhues (2004). We show that if an assumption on distributions of bidders’ types holds, then a truth-telling strategy equilibrium brings the highest expected revenue to the seller. When the assumption is violated, however, the truth-telling strategy equilibrium may not be optimal.
Keywords:
highest expected;
sealed bid;
price sealed;
second price;
expected revenue;
bid auctions
Journal Title: Economics Letters
Year Published: 2018
Link to full text (if available)
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Journal Title: Economics Letters
Year Published: 2018
Link to full text (if available)
Share on Social Media: Sign Up to like & get
recommendations!