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The symmetric two-player Hirshleifer contest admits a unique equilibrium. The equilibrium support is finite and includes the zero expenditure level. We also establish a lower bound for the cardinality of… Click to show full abstract
The symmetric two-player Hirshleifer contest admits a unique equilibrium. The equilibrium support is finite and includes the zero expenditure level. We also establish a lower bound for the cardinality of the support and an upper bound for the undissipated rent.
Keywords:
symmetric two;
player hirshleifer;
hirshleifer contest;
two player
Journal Title: Economics Letters
Year Published: 2018
Link to full text (if available)
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Journal Title: Economics Letters
Year Published: 2018
Link to full text (if available)
Share on Social Media: Sign Up to like & get
recommendations!