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Bank runs as a coordination problem within a two-bank set-up: Who will survive?

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Abstract We experimentally test a new extension of the Diamond and Dybvig model with two banks where, in addition to keeping and withdrawing, depositors of the first bank can relocate… Click to show full abstract

Abstract We experimentally test a new extension of the Diamond and Dybvig model with two banks where, in addition to keeping and withdrawing, depositors of the first bank can relocate their deposits to the second bank at no cost. In contrast to the second bank, the first bank experiences more panics, although the number of simultaneous bank runs decreases. We highlight the importance of studying bank runs as a system-related phenomenon where depositors can change their initial deposit allocation.

Keywords: bank; within two; problem within; runs coordination; coordination problem; bank runs

Journal Title: Economics Letters
Year Published: 2019

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