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The paper develops a new extension of the sequential preference condition, which leads to unique stable matching in all subpopulations, obtained by consistent restrictions of the marriage matching problem. Under… Click to show full abstract
The paper develops a new extension of the sequential preference condition, which leads to unique stable matching in all subpopulations, obtained by consistent restrictions of the marriage matching problem. Under the new condition, the Gale–Shapley algorithm is stable, consistent, strategy-proof, Pareto optimal for men, and Pareto optimal for women.
Keywords:
matching problem;
sufficient condition;
marriage matching;
necessary sufficient;
condition
Journal Title: Economics Letters
Year Published: 2019
Link to full text (if available)
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Journal Title: Economics Letters
Year Published: 2019
Link to full text (if available)
Share on Social Media: Sign Up to like & get
recommendations!