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In a simple multitask assignments model with adverse selection, we derive the optimal contracts when the principal assigns two tasks to different agents or to a single agent. Assigning tasks… Click to show full abstract
In a simple multitask assignments model with adverse selection, we derive the optimal contracts when the principal assigns two tasks to different agents or to a single agent. Assigning tasks to different agents introduces a cross-checking device, while assigning tasks to a single agent relaxes participation constraints. The principal prefers to combine tasks to a single agent except for the case in which the correlation of types is positive and strong enough.
Keywords:
multitask assignments;
adverse selection;
assignments adverse;
single agent
Journal Title: Economics Letters
Year Published: 2019
Link to full text (if available)
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Journal Title: Economics Letters
Year Published: 2019
Link to full text (if available)
Share on Social Media: Sign Up to like & get
recommendations!