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We analyze the incentive effects of the Performance-Vesting Equity (PVE) component of executive pay that is characterized by zero exercise price and performance-contingent vesting. We demonstrate how PVE with upward-sloping… Click to show full abstract
We analyze the incentive effects of the Performance-Vesting Equity (PVE) component of executive pay that is characterized by zero exercise price and performance-contingent vesting. We demonstrate how PVE with upward-sloping convex/concave vesting curves can be a more efficient risk-sharing and incentive alignment device than strictly convex stock options.
Keywords:
cost efficient;
performance;
vesting equity;
performance vesting;
efficient performance
Journal Title: Economics Letters
Year Published: 2019
Link to full text (if available)
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Journal Title: Economics Letters
Year Published: 2019
Link to full text (if available)
Share on Social Media: Sign Up to like & get
recommendations!