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Abstract In the standard auction model, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition on the value domain under which non-trivial mechanisms exist that satisfy group strategy-proofness and symmetry. In particular,… Click to show full abstract
Abstract In the standard auction model, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition on the value domain under which non-trivial mechanisms exist that satisfy group strategy-proofness and symmetry. In particular, this condition is satisfied (violated) if values are drawn from a finite set (an interval).
Keywords:
proof fair;
fair auctions;
collusion proof
Journal Title: Economics Letters
Year Published: 2019
Link to full text (if available)
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Journal Title: Economics Letters
Year Published: 2019
Link to full text (if available)
Share on Social Media: Sign Up to like & get
recommendations!