Abstract We construct a Markov game of cross-border post-merger integration on technology innovation. The acquirer chooses the integration degree considering resource backgrounds and then makes innovation collaborations. Equilibrium analysis and… Click to show full abstract
Abstract We construct a Markov game of cross-border post-merger integration on technology innovation. The acquirer chooses the integration degree considering resource backgrounds and then makes innovation collaborations. Equilibrium analysis and numerical examples suggest that when resource similarity is high and resource complementarity is low, the acquirer should choose a high integration degree to improve the number of innovation collaborations and increase technology innovation. When resource similarity is low and complementarity is high, the acquirer should choose a low integration degree. When resource similarity and complementarity are both high, the acquirer should choose a medium integration degree. We run quantile regressions using samples of cross-border mergers and acquisitions proposed by acquirers from China, Japan and the United States in the period of 2000–2013. The dynamic game and quantile regressions altogether provide new insight and empirical evidence for understanding post-merger integration's effect on technology innovation under different resource backgrounds. The paper provides theoretical direction for choosing proper cross-border post-merger integration degree to improve innovation with resource-based view.
               
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