LAUSR

Abstract To what extent can energy infrastructure become a tool for insurgents? Non-state, insurgent actors have increased attacks on critical energy infrastructure over time (Giroux et al., 2013). As critical energy infrastructure becomes more complex and interconnected, attacks on this infrastructure can have far reaching consequences not only for the economy but also for social institutions. Leveraging exogenously scheduled elections in Colombia and microlevel energy infrastructure attack data, we use multivariate linear regression to show that insurgent groups, Las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and Ejercito de Liberacion (ELN), time attacks on critical energy infrastructure in the months before an election. We find that the likelihood of an attack on electricity transmission lines and substations increased by 34% in the lead up to election months and that the number of attacks increased by 37% during election months. We further find these attacks are correlated with reduced voter turnout, indicating that infrastructure attacks may undermine participation in democratic institutions. These findings are particularly interesting as democratic societies—burgeoning and established—try to identify the unintended vulnerabilities to society that accompany the benefits of increased interconnectedness.