LAUSR

In countries where GPs fulfill a central role in the health care system, like in the Netherlands, the lack of value-based incentives in GP payment systems may have negative consequences for value delivered in other parts of the health care spectrum. We evaluate an experiment in which GPs were allowed to share in savings in total health care expenditures, conditionally on achieving quality targets. At least in theory, these so-called 'shared savings contracts' incentivize GPs to become critical gatekeepers, coordinate the provision of care and substitute for specialist services when appropriate. This study evaluates a Dutch shared savings program targeted at GPs. This study employs a difference-in-differences design using a regional control group of non-participating GPs. We find that program participation led to savings in health care expenditures (-2%), while patient satisfaction was unaffected and while the results for other quality indicators were ambiguous. Additional analyses show that savings have been predominantly realized by lowering the volume of specialist care, and that almost every participating GP displayed cost-saving behavior. This finding suggests that shared savings contracts, even when added as a mere complemented to existing volume-based payment models, already elicit substantive effort to increase the value of health care provided.