LAUSR

Abstract Empirical results about the effect of open reserve price on ending prices in auctions are mixed, with some researchers finding a positive effect on ending price and others reporting a negative or no effect. The objective of this research is to propose a new theoretical framework. First, without an open reserve price, auctions attract more bidders, resulting in increased competition and higher ending prices—a so-called competition effect. Second, a high open reserve price may serve as a price floor or a reference price, influencing bidders' valuations and increasing ending prices. Quantile regression is used, which has the advantage of providing robust parameter estimates of the effect of open reserve prices on ending prices for different levels of the reserve price. Estimates of a longitudinal data set for four products collected over a period of one year show an u-shaped relationship between open reserve prices and ending prices, where either no reserves or high reserves results in higher ending prices. By comparing ending prices of auctions with an open reserve versus a secret reserve, it is shown that open reserve prices have a reference-price effect rather than a price-floor effect.