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Abstract This paper provides a brief introduction to t-Tree , a general auction software package that implements single-unit auctions, Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auctions (“VCG auctions”), Simultaneous Multiple Round Auctions (“SMRA”), and Combinatorial… Click to show full abstract
Abstract This paper provides a brief introduction to t-Tree , a general auction software package that implements single-unit auctions, Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auctions (“VCG auctions”), Simultaneous Multiple Round Auctions (“SMRA”), and Combinatorial Clock Auctions (“CCA”) used in transportation, logistics, procurements, and spectrum allocation. The critical contribution of t-Tree is that it can handle computational complexities of the winner determination problem in large-scale combinatorial auctions by natively implementing Zhong et al. (2004)’s combinatorial optimization algorithms. Thus researchers can study large-scale combinatorial auction mechanisms off the shelf using t-Tree .
Journal Title: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance
Year Published: 2019
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