LAUSR

Abstract Motivated by the prevalence and persistence of corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) despite high-profile anti-corruption efforts, and by calls for more research on unethical organizational behavior by firms in Africa, we investigated the link between bribery in 12 SSA countries and the phenomenon of organizational isomorphism, long used to explain legitimate, but rarely, illegitimate firm practices. Analysis of 5989 SSA firms in three distinct industries known for high levels of bribery reveals direct positive relationships between bribery and its perception as frequently practiced in specific industries (“mimetic isomorphic effect”); institutional constraints on businesses (“coercive isomorphic effect”); and local market rivalry (“competitive isomorphic effect”). Institutional coercion is the strongest determinant of bribery, while imitation and competitive rivalry routinize the practice. However, the effect of isomorphic pressures on bribery practices varies across industries. Therefore, institutional redesigns, policy remediations and managerial actions to mitigate bribery must consider the cross-industry variations.