LAUSR

Abstract Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) systems have been criticized to provide little incentive for producers to eco-design. To this end, an incentive scheme, called eco-modulation, based on modulated product fees according to their level of eco-design has recently been introduced. This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the introduction of this scheme as part of the collective EPR system in the WEEE sector in France and discusses the impacts of this policy instrument on product design (direct effects) and collective action and innovation (indirect effects). From a theoretical standpoint, we consider policy instruments in our research as part of complex policy mixes and within adaptive policy-making, i.e. on how these mixes evolve over time to adapt to complex and changing issues and collective dynamics. In this perspective, we stress that, while eco-modulation has shown little direct impact, important indirect effects can be identified. We argue that framework conditions, i.e. how the EPR system is organized and conducted in practice, explain better the occurrence of such indirect effects rather than the policy instrument in itself. In this perspective, the paper provides insights on the role of Producer Responsibility Organizations (PRO) in linking individual and collective producer responsibilities and organizing collective action. Moreover, it shows that implementing such a policy instrument requires intense dialog with stakeholders to advance its acceptability, a collective organization to organize its monitoring and deployment, and careful integration with other instruments within a coherent and adaptive policy.