LAUSR

Abstract The objective of this study is to examine the impact of managerial ownership on carbon transparency. Agency theory suggests that there is conflict of interest between managers and shareholders, and managers tend to take advantage of information asymmetry to entrench their interest. Further, extant literature indicates that management entrenchment incentives is linked with managerial ownership. Draw on agency theory and the insight from prior studies, we argue and predict that corporate carbon transparency is associated with management entrenchment incentives. We measure management entrenchment using managerial ownership and find a positive association between managerial ownership and carbon transparency in the low (0%–10 %) and high (beyond 30 %) regions of convergence-of-interest. However, this relationship becomes negative when ownership is in the entrenchment region (10%–30 %). The findings suggest that managers with ownership in the regions of convergence-of-interest are inclined to be open and apply a proactive strategy, whereas entrenched managers are likely to be opaque, so become insensitive to call for climate stabilisation and carbon transparency.