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This paper is concerned with the implications of unanimity and anonymity for the Arrovian social choice theory when population is infinite. Contrary to the finite population case, various unanimity and… Click to show full abstract
This paper is concerned with the implications of unanimity and anonymity for the Arrovian social choice theory when population is infinite. Contrary to the finite population case, various unanimity and anonymity axioms can be formulated. We show a tension between unanimity and anonymity by providing possibility and impossibility results. We also examine the case in which social preferences are allowed to be quasi-transitive.
Keywords:
infinite population;
anonymity infinite;
unanimity anonymity;
anonymity
Journal Title: Journal of Mathematical Economics
Year Published: 2017
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Journal Title: Journal of Mathematical Economics
Year Published: 2017
Link to full text (if available)
Share on Social Media: Sign Up to like & get
recommendations!