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Abstract In this paper, we first obtain some infinite-dimension versions of Scarf’s theorem. Second, we provide two generalizations of Scarf (1971) to normal-form games with infinitely many players. Under the… Click to show full abstract
Abstract In this paper, we first obtain some infinite-dimension versions of Scarf’s theorem. Second, we provide two generalizations of Scarf (1971) to normal-form games with infinitely many players. Under the assumptions analogous to Scarf (1971), we prove the nonemptiness of the finite-coalition α -core. Furthermore, by strengthening the assumptions, we obtain the nonemptiness of the weak α -core, and show that the weak α -core coincides with the closed-coalition α -core.
Keywords:
scarf theorem;
coalition;
infinite player;
generalizations scarf;
finite coalition;
core
Journal Title: Journal of Mathematical Economics
Year Published: 2017
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Journal Title: Journal of Mathematical Economics
Year Published: 2017
Link to full text (if available)
Share on Social Media: Sign Up to like & get
recommendations!