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We consider generalized sender-receiver games in which the sender also has a decision to make, but this decision does not directly affect the receiver. We introduce specific perfect Bayesian equilibria,… Click to show full abstract
We consider generalized sender-receiver games in which the sender also has a decision to make, but this decision does not directly affect the receiver. We introduce specific perfect Bayesian equilibria, in which the players agree on a joint decision after that a message has been sent (\"talk and cooperate equilibrium\", TCE). We establish that a TCE exists provided that the receiver has a \"uniform punishment decision\" (UPD) against the sender.
Keywords:
decision;
sender receiver;
games cooperation;
receiver games;
receiver
Journal Title: Journal of Mathematical Economics
Year Published: 2017
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Journal Title: Journal of Mathematical Economics
Year Published: 2017
Link to full text (if available)
Share on Social Media: Sign Up to like & get
recommendations!