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A game theoretic perspective on the management of shared North Sea fishery resources: Pre and post Brexit

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Abstract Since the introduction of the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) regime, North Sea coastal states have cooperated in the management of shared stocks. Norway and the EU… Click to show full abstract

Abstract Since the introduction of the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) regime, North Sea coastal states have cooperated in the management of shared stocks. Norway and the EU have jointly managed six shared stocks through the 1980 Agreement which includes the annual setting of total allowable catch quotas (TACs), quota shares and access agreements. This article first attempts to explain in a game theoretic context why cooperative management of shared North Sea fish stocks has been stable for more than 40 years. Brexit represented a shock to the cooperative agreement, and there are now three parties to the negotiations. The UK EEZ is important not only for British fishermen, but also for Norway and the EU27. The UK and the EU have agreed on a Trade and Cooperation Agreement which includes fisheries, but Norway and the UK have not yet reached a fisheries agreement. In the second part of the article we analyse the UK-EU fisheries agreement, the continuation of the 1980 Agreement, and the future fisheries relationship between the UK and Norway.

Keywords: north sea; agreement; game theoretic; management shared

Journal Title: Marine Policy
Year Published: 2021

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