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Preliminary assessment of a combined passive safety system for typical 3-loop PWR CPR1000

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Abstract As the development of the nuclear industry, passive technology turns out to be a remarkable characteristic of advanced nuclear power plants. Since the 20th century, much effort has been… Click to show full abstract

Abstract As the development of the nuclear industry, passive technology turns out to be a remarkable characteristic of advanced nuclear power plants. Since the 20th century, much effort has been given to the passive technology, and a number of evolutionary passive systems have developed. Thoughts have been given to upgrade the existing reactors with passive systems to meet stricter safety demands. In this paper, the CPR1000 plant, which is one kind of mature pressurized water reactor plants in China, is improved with some passive systems to enhance safety. The passive systems selected are as follows: (1) the reactor makeup tank (RMT); (2) the advanced accumulator (A-ACC); (3) the in-containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST); (4) the passive emergency feed water system (PEFS), which is installed on the secondary side of SGs; (5) the passive depressurization system (PDS). Although these passive components is based on the passive technology of some advanced reactors, their structural and trip designs are adjusted specifically so that it could be able to mitigate accidents of the CPR1000. Utilizing the RELAP5/MOD3.3 code, accident analyses (small break loss of coolant accident, large break loss of coolant accident, main feed water line break accident) of this improved CPR1000 plant were presented to demonstrate three different accident mitigation methods of the safety system and to test whether the passive safety system preformed its function well. In the SBLOCA, all components of the passive safety system were put into work sequentially, which prevented the core uncover. The LBLOCA analysis illustrates the contribution of the A-ACCs whose small-flow-rate injection can control the maximum cladding temperature effectively. In the MFLB, due to the proper design of the PEFSs, the PRZ was not overfilled by water so that no liquid leakage to the containment happened. Massive radiation release was prevented. Generally speaking, the passive safety system functions as expected, and the three accident mitigation method were proved to be useful for mitigating corresponding accidents.

Keywords: passive safety; system; water; safety; safety system; cpr1000

Journal Title: Nuclear Engineering and Design
Year Published: 2017

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