LAUSR

Abstract Evolutionary processes in hierarchical integrated energy systems (HIESs) generally lead to formations of coalitions which consolidate energy producers and energy consumers, typically driven by stakeholder benefits. However, the impacts of multiple coalitions on the operations of HIESs have seldom been analyzed in previous studies. In this study, a trading scheme was developed to analyze the operation of an HIES with the structure of one electricity utility company and one natural gas utility company in the upper level, multiple distributed energy stations (DESs) in the middle level, and multiple users in the lower level. The analytical expression of the optimal operation strategy of each market participant in each possible coalition, which was composed of DESs and users, was derived using the Lagrange’s function. The results indicate that: (i) parameter changes in one coalition do not impact operations of other coalitions; (ii) DESs whose original customer tend to consume more electricity and heat with the same energy price would maintain their vested interests by remaining isolated; (iii) users hope to attract more DESs to decrease electricity price and heat price, however, DESs with high generation coefficients are unwelcome; and (iv) technological improvements of one DES will increase its own profits and decrease profits associated to other DESs in the same coalition.