LAUSR

Abstract Collaborative governance is often used as a strategy to address seemingly intractable common pool resource (CPR) problems. However, significant power imbalances can constrain the creation, adoption and implementation of socially and environmentally desirable policies. This study integrates theory on power with the institutional analysis and design (IAD) framework in order to provide a conceptual framework for examining power that is not captured through the IAD’s focus on action situations. We examined the use of collaboration in CPR governance contexts characterized by significant power imbalances. Two Canadian collaborative processes that involve large energy industry interests were studied. We assessed the ability of these collaborative processes to address social and environmental goals. Results revealed significant hidden power dynamics related to inaction and non-decisions. Collaboration was unable to produce progressive outcomes because of i) the restriction of the collaborative agenda by powerful actors; ii) selective enforcement of rules; and; iii) a broader neoliberal context that inherently favoured increasing resource extraction. These findings indicate that the achievement of progressive social and environmental outcomes through collaboration is constrained where powerful resource industries are present as participants.