LAUSR

courts have an expanded spatial reach compared to national courts insofar as their jurisdictions extend beyond a single territory. They have a mediated authority insofar as much of what they do is dependent upon being supplied and enforced by domestic courts. Even in these circumstances, they must, finally, compete for work insofar as they do not enjoy a monopoly of power but must demonstrate why they should be utilized instead of other institutional arenas. These conditions will only be met where there is a settled consensus among sufficiently powerful constituencies in an array of neighboring states that an international court offers such clear advantages over other institutions, and that these advantages override the risk of individual decisions or a line of reasoning that goes against the preferences of these or other constituencies. What to make of this normatively? First, it suggests that international courts are associated with the fragmentation of international law. The activity of even courts with general appellations, such as the International Court of Justice, has historically been strongly oriented around a relatively small number of topics, such as title to territory and maritime delimitation. This fragmentation raises questions about how generalizable legal principles developed by these courts should be. If developed in a particular sectoral context, there may be particular reasons why certain norms should be more central to that context than elsewhere, and, even if this is not so, this context will ensure privileged access to this process for limited groups of participants. Secondly, the effects of international courts on international relations and globalization remain uncertain. To be sure, Alter and Helfer’s work suggests that the Andean Tribunal gives greater voice to a wider array of interests and values than might have been the case otherwise. The Tribunal also induced the intellectual property agencies in the region to commit themselves more strongly to law observance and good governance. However, the extent of this is unclear. Moreover, it may also be that the Tribunal legitimizes an intellectual property regime that gives enterprises from outside the region freer sway and greater profits than many citizens of the region would be happy about. The case on that is also unproven. If this sounds less than enthusiastic, it may be because the charm of international courts, outside the field of human rights, lies in modest ambitions. They offer an imperfect supplement and check where the other institutions that form the engine of international law—foreign ministries, regulatory agencies, or, as was the case with the Andean Tribunal, other agencies—are acknowledged as needing improvement. Their emancipatory potential lies in that desire for improvement. Sight must not be lost of that.